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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The move to cheap labor and unregulated enterprise abroad puts an individual firm in an 
advantageous competitive position. But in the aggregate, this movement creates conditions for global 
economic stagnation. An enterprise cannot have constantly cheaper foreign sources of supply and 
constantly lower wages and benefits at home, on one hand, and constantly expanding domestic and 
foreign markets to sell its goods, on the other hand. As each firm sheds workers, cuts the wages of those 
who remain, and invests in cheap labor sources for manufactured goods, it will find that mass purchasing 
power to buy its products has dissipated. 
Proponents of NAFTA sought to mask this contradiction with rhetoric about "dynamizing" the North 
American economy. New U.S. investment in Mexico made secure by the terms of NAFTA would expand 
the Mexican middle class and create demand for products and services from the United States. U.S. 
workers in low wage, labor intensive sectors, who would have lost their jobs anyway to Thailand or to 
Poland, would now find productive work in sectors serving a growing North American market. 
There is no evidence that this is anything more than rhetoric. Where large investments in Mexico have 
been made by Ford, Volkswagen and other auto manufacturers, workers’ wages have been cut and their 
unions enfeebled, even where productivity rivals that of the home factories. Where substantial 
investments have been made in the maquiladora, wages are held to a pittance. Massive layoffs and plant 
closings have been announced by U.S. companies with investments in Mexico—GE, GTE, AT&T, IBM, Xerox 
and others. Meanwhile, the Chiapas uprising exposed Mexico as desperately in need of far-reaching 
social and political reforms, not elite deal-making with the United States. 
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NAFTA as a form of regional hegemony 
The single multinational enterprise can conduct a global business strategy, but a nation's 
ruling business elite, alongside its government planners and policymakers, can effectively 
manage only a regional economic program. The emergence of regional trade regimes in 
a global economic context has its source in concern over this "control factor": 
- stability—where change is gradual, not sudden; 
- predictability—where changes can be seen in advance; and 
- manageability—where the pattern of change can be influenced (and to the extent 
possible, controlled) are paramount concerns for national capital and national govern-
ments. 
Events that spin out of control jeopardize large scale investments, on one hand, and 
fates of governments on the other. 
The individual firm can have a degree of control over its affairs on a global, not a 
regional scale, because of the singularity of its mission: maximizing return to shareholders. 
For example, General Electric produces small motors in the Mexican maquiladora, 
locomotives in Brazil, light bulbs in Hungary, air conditioners in Korea, and engages in 
joint ventures across regional bounds with European and Japanese manufacturers. But a 
single nation's multinational companies as a whole cannot control global events any 
more than a single nation's government can control them. There are too many competing 
factions and interests. Each of G.E.'s major divisions, for example—electrical equipment, 
transportation, jet engines etc. faces major domestic competition: Emerson motors, GM 
locomotives, Pratt & Whitney engines, etc. It is obvious that the United States, arguably 
the sole "superpower" on the world scene, cannot control world events either. 
Neither the United States, Japan or the European Union, nor any of their investor 
elites, can manage commerce on a global scale. There are simply too many uncertainties 
and variables outside their effective control. A degree of control, however, is achievable 
at the regional level where a mix of economic, political, cultural, geographic, military 
and other influences can be brought to bear on events in the region. While the single 
multinational can "go global", the collective of a nation's multinationals needs a regional 
"haven" where they can regroup in times of turmoil. 
Regional hegemony provides a framework of control where corporate strategists can 
make investment plans and decisions in a climate of stability, predictability and manage-
ability with reasonable confidence of success. Such a framework is especially needed 
when the principal trading powers themselves have an unstable, friction-ridden relations-
hip. This is precisely the case between the United States and Japan, with the recent 
disputes over numerical targets as a market-opening mechanism, and the re-imposition 
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by President Clinton of the "Super 301" weapon threatening unilateral trade sanctions 
against Japan.1 Similarly, the United States and several European countries have had 
sharp struggles over such issues as subsidies for Airbus, subsidized agricultural production, 
and cultural penetration through film, video, music and books.2 
Cross-regional frictions between developed and developing countries are also common. 
Korea has often protested U.S. "dumping" complaints as ploys to restrict entry of 
Korean-made goods into the U.S. market, at the same time that the U.S. pressures 
Korea to open its markets.3 U.S. pressure on China and Indonesia about human rights 
concerns, backed by threats of trade sanctions, have heightened diplomatic and political 
tension.4 
Such friction between the dominant power in a region, however, and its subordinate 
regional partners, is relatively rare. The United States imposed most of the terms of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement on Mexico. Canada had to join, otherwise 
access to the expanded free trade area would be denied to its firms and investors. Other 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are lining up to enter the regional accord, 
with few complaints about U.S. hegemony.5 Similarly in Europe, the new nations of 
the East are eager to be admitted to the European Free Trade Area and the European 
Union. So are several countries that resisted European Community membership for 
decades—Sweden, Finland and Austria are on the verge of joining the EU. 
Frictions at the global level and the uncertainties they create for large scale foreign 
investments are what compelled the United States corporate and governmental elites to 
unite so firmly to secure the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), even 
while the GATT negotiations to modify the global trading regime were in their final 
stages. They needed to "lock in" a source of cheap labor and unregulated enterprise 
subject to U.S. hegemony. Mexico, with its population of nearly 100 million and vast 
energy reserves, fit the bill—the American analogy to Eastern Europe for the EU, and 
Southeast Asia for Japan.6 Now the U.S. is pressing to extend NAFTA into South 
America, where Chile's free market reforms under the Pinochet military dictatorship, 
maintained by the new Christian Democratic government, have made it the first likely 
entrant.7 
The offensive against workers and trade unions 
A large, nearby source of low wage labor and low-regulation enterprise also fuels a 
corporate offensive against national trade union movements and working class living 
standards in the developed countries. Most corporate explanations of their competitiveness 
problems boil down to two charges: their workers make too much money and have too 
much leisure time. In many cases, they say it is the fault of trade unions that demand 
too much and fail to unite with management to "beat the competition". Thus, the 
worldwide neoliberal project puts at the top of its agenda the breaking of trade union 
strength and the repeal of social standards and protective legislation.8 
The transfer of jobs, and threats of further transfers, to neighboring countries where 
workers labor long hours for low pay pressure employees in the industrialized countries 
to accept wage cuts and benefit reductions. Workers affected by layoffs and plant 
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shutdowns have to find new jobs in the lower paid service sector.9 This is often 
contingent labor involving part time and temporary jobs, "independent contractor" status 
or other unstable, marginal employment relationships with no job security or fringe 
benefits.10 More than twenty-five million Americans are employed in temporary, part-time 
or other "atypical" jobs. 
In many developed countries, job cuts have also led to a decline in the size and 
strength of the organized labor movement. For example, 35% of the U.S. workforce 
was represented by trade unions in the 1950's (and more than 40% in the private 
sector). Today it is 16% of the total workforce and only 12% of the private sector 
workforce. 
Not all of this decline is due to structural changes in the economy. Vicious anti-unionism, 
deliberate breaking of unions and unlawful suppression of new organizing efforts also 
characterize the U.S. labor relations reality. Thousands of American workers are fired 
by companies each year for trying to form a union. Legal remedies are painfully slow 
and ineffective. Most victimized workers accept a modest severance pay and move on, 
leaving the workplace unorganized and the workers who remain too demoralized to try 
again. Corporations engaged in "downsizing" often have a choice between closing a 
unionized facility and a non-union plant. Almost universally, they close the union-
represented operation.11 
The anti-union climate prevailing in the United States has attracted prominent European 
firms to relocate operations to the U.S. For example, BMW is developing a large 
factory in the state of South Carolina, which has the lowest rate of unionization in the 
United States.12 In Great Britain, the Thatcher government introduced several changes 
in labor law and labor relations practice that were modeled on the U.S. experience. Now 
Britain serves as a target for "runaway plants" from the Continent.13 
Where unions still exist, their members are under enormous pressure to reduce wages 
and benefits to preserve their jobs. Overall, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, 
the real wages of U.S. workers have declined more than 13% in the past quarter-century. 
Only the massive entry of women into the workforce, and an expansion of youth 
employment, have held up family incomes.14 
NAFTA as a response to global stagnation 
The move to cheap labor and unregulated enterprise abroad puts an individual firm in 
an advantageous competitive position. But in the aggregate, this movement creates 
conditions for global economic stagnation. An enterprise cannot have constantly cheaper 
foreign sources of supply and constantly lower wages and benefits at home, on one 
hand, and constantly expanding domestic and foreign markets to sell its goods, on the 
other hand. As each firm sheds workers, cuts the wages of those who remain, and 
invests in cheap labor sources for manufactured goods, it will find that mass purchasing 
power to buy its products has dissipated. 
Proponents of NAFTA sought to mask this contradiction with rhetoric about "dyna-
mizing" the North American economy. New U.S. investment in Mexico made secure by 
the terms of NAFTA would expand the Mexican middle class and create demand for 
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products and services from the United States. U.S. workers in low wage, labor intensive 
sectors, who would have lost their jobs anyway to Thailand or to Poland, would now 
find productive work in sectors serving a growing North American market. 
There is no evidence that this is anything more than rhetoric. Where large investments 
in Mexico have been made by Ford, Volkswagen and other auto manufacturers, workers 
wages have been cut and their unions enfeebled, even where productivity rivals that of 
the home factories.15 Where substantial investments have been made in the maquiladora, 
wages are held to a pittance. Massive layoffs and plant closings have been announced 
by U.S. companies with investments in Mexico—GE, GTE, AT&T, IBM, Xerox and 
others.16 Meanwhile, the Chiapas uprising exposed Mexico as desperately in need of 
far-reaching social and political reforms, not elite deal-making with the United States. 
The battle over NAFTA 
The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed by three "lame duck"17 heads 
of state in August, 1992. Brian Mulroney was the Canadian prime minister who had 
already announced his withdrawal from office, U.S. president George Bush was running 
unsuccessfully for re-election, and Carlos Salinas de Gortari was serving his final year 
as president of Mexico. In October, 1992, Democratic Party presidential candidate Bill 
Clinton declared that he would not submit the NAFTA for congressional approval 
unless two "side accords" were also negotiated, one on labor standards and one on the 
environment.18 Clinton was elected president in November, and took office in January, 
1993. 
Negotiations on labor and environmental side agreements began in the Spring of 
1993 and concluded in August. A split that had already taken shape in the new Clinton 
administration, between "Wall Street Democrats" like Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, 
investment bankers Robert Rubin and Roger Altman and other center-right elements of 
the Democratic Party on one side, and the more traditional labor-oriented and center-left 
Democrats, like Labor Secretary Robert Reich, repeated itself in the labor side agreement 
negotiations.19 
Officials from the U.S. Department of Labor participated in negotiations on the labor 
side agreement, but trade specialists led by U.S. GATT negotiators headed the U.S. 
bargaining committee. Behind the scenes, corporate lobbyists were insisting that labor 
issues that might subject U.S. companies to scrutiny or criticism, particularly rights of 
association, organizing, bargaining and the right to strike, be left out of any enforcement 
mechanism. Labor Department officials were marginalized, and sometimes even cut out 
of important caucus discussions of the U.S. side. The result, according to sources close 
to the negotiations, was that trade policy concerns trumped labor policy goals, and labor 
rights were subordinated to multinational business interests. 
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Labor's struggle against NAFTA ':-.<. *•• T; 
U.S. workers, trade unions and their allies in the United States mounted a strong 
campaign of opposition to NAFTA.20 There was a subtle division among labor progres-
sives and other anti-NAFTA forces. Some opposed any continental trade agreement; 
whatever form it took. Others argued that a NAFTA with a strong Social Charter might 
be acceptable. Since a strong Social Charter never appeared, this incipient division 
never became a problem. 
Labor advocates were unanimous in opposition to the NAFTA. With no enforceable 
labor standards, they argued, Mexico's low wages, government-dominated unions and 
lack of environmental protection would accelerate the movement of jobs from the 
United States. The NAFTA held out no prospect of "upward harmonization" of labor 
standards. "Say no to this NAFTA" became the slogan of labor and its allies. 
Environmental forces divided between those who viewed the environmental side 
agreement as acceptable, and those who argued that it fell short of necessary protective 
measures.21 The labor movement, environmentalists opposed to the NAFTA, and elements 
of consumer groups, farmer advocacy organizations, migrant workers support organiza-
tions, religious and human rights groups, sustainable development advocates and grass 
roots community organizations made up the progressive sector of the anti-NAFTA 
coalition. Elements of the disaffected middle class sympathetic to Ross Perot's presidential 
candidacy, which drew 19% of the vote in 1992, and some far-right racist, xenophobic 
forces also opposed the NAFTA. Labor and its allies did not coordinate its work with 
those groups. 
Trade union and worker rights advocates, along with allies from other organizations 
in the coalition opposed to NAFTA, formed two major coalitions. The Citizens Trade 
Campaign (CTC) focused its efforts on grass roots organizing in congressional districts 
around the country. Its participants organized demonstrations, marches, meetings and 
conferences, media events and other tactics aimed at influencing their Member of 
Congress to vote against the NAFTA. The Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART) con-
centrated its efforts on coordination with counterpart groups in Mexico and Canada, 
principally the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade and the Action Canada Network. 
The ART produced a US. Citizens' Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
and organized a series of tri-national conferences that rotated among several cities in 
the United States, Mexico and Canada. Working together, these coalitions of the three 
countries elaborated an alternative to the governments' NAFTA that emphasized sustain-
able development, increased wages for workers, human and labor rights, environmental 
protection and enhanced democracy in the three nations of North America.22 
The anti-NAFTA coalition conceded the U.S. Senate, which is dominated by wealthy 
business interests, and concentrated its efforts on defeating NAFTA in the House of 
Representatives. They forced a fierce battle in that body, where the pro-NAFTA forces 
ultimately prevailed by a 234-200 vote. In the end, the combined power of the corporate 
community, alongside an administration dominated by "Wall Street Democrats" and 
practically all of the academy and the media, proved too much for the anti-NAFTA 
forces to overcome. 
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NAFTA and the labor side agreement 
1. Overall view of the NAFTA 
The North American Free Trade Agreement contains 2,000 pages covering most features 
of modern international trade relations. Most of its elements have already been tested in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 
1989, various European trade pacts and other variants of the model that began taking 
shape in the original GATT negotiations that followed World War II. 
But NAFTA goes beyond other global and regional trade pacts in its scope. Besides 
covering traditional GATT issues like scheduled tariff reductions for manufactured 
goods, non-tariff trade barriers, technical standards, subsidies, dumping, and the like, 
the NAFTA goes on to encompass agriculture, financial services, investments and other 
issues kept out of the GATT. The Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) chapter of the 
NAFTA was dictated by U.S. patent and copyright holders, who achieved all their 
objectives. In contrast, they could only come out of GATT negotiations with their goals 
partially met, especially where French resistance stymied free trade in cultural products. 
NAFTA's IPR chapter forces Mexico to revise its laws and its judicial structure to 
impose sharp, swift sanctions on violators. The treatment of intellectual property gives 
the lie to claims that a strong labor rights provision would infringe on national sovereignty. 
Mexico abandoned sovereignty concerns in the face of demands by U.S. owners of 
intellectual property, backed up by U.S. government declarations that it would see the 
NAFTA killed unless the IPR demands were met. 
2. Overview of the labor side agreement 
The weak NAFTA labor side agreement stands in sharp contrast to the strong provision 
for intellectual property rights. To begin, the labor accord is not an integral part of the 
NAFTA, but a separate Executive Agreement. It was not approved by Congress when 
Congress approved the NAFTA. Any party to the NAFTA, in fact, can repudiate the 
labor side accord without affecting the NAFTA. 
The labor side accord (titled "North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation" or 
NAALC) rests on the foundation of "national enforcement of national law", not a single 
set of common standards for the three countries. After a broad "Statement of Objectives" 
in Article 1, Article 2 recognizes "the right of each Party to establish its own domestic 
labor standards". Thus, the notion of a social charter of fundamental rights established 
on a tri-national basis, promoted by labor rights advocates who pointed to the European 
Union's Social Charter as an example of multilateral standard-setting (if not a precise 
model for North America) was abandoned at the outset. 
With "national enforcement of national law" as the guiding principle, Mexico's mini-
mum wage of less than five dollars per day, or its permission for fourteen-year-old 
children to work in industry, or its discrimination against independent unions not connected 
to the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, could not be modified under NAFTA. 
Likewise, U.S. laws permitting the permanent replacement of strikers, or its failure to 
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enforce rules against anti-union discrimination, or the proliferation of sweatshops in 
large cities paying sub-minimum wages and employing child labor, or U.S. "right-to-work" 
laws, cannot be rectified under NAFTA.23 
There is no plan in the NAFTA for an "upward harmonization" of labor rights and 
standards, even over a long term. The alternative, indeed, is a "downward harmonization" 
in what is often called a "race to the bottom" by employers seeking lower labor costs 
and weakened labor protections. 
Despite this fundamental weakness of a lack of minimum standards and a failure to 
move toward harmonization—except downward—a measure of tri-national oversight is 
established in the NAALC, along with the potential for trade sanctions (but, as discussed 
below, only in very narrowly drawn circumstances). The NAALC sets up three tiers of 
enforcement depending on the subject matter to be addressed, and creates three bu-
reaucratic entities to deal with each level of enforcement. 
3. Details of the labor side agreement 
The key obligation set forth in Article 3 of the NAALC is for each Party to "effectively 
enforce its labor law". This formulation requires a turn to Article 49, Definitions, which 
is reproduced here in full because the definition of "labor law" is critical to the discussion 
that follows: 
"Labor law" means laws and regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to: 
(a) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; 
(b) the right to bargain collectively; 
(c) the right to strike; 
(d) prohibition of forced labor; 
(e) labor protections for children and young persons; 
(f) minimum employment standards, such as minimum wages and overtime pay, covering wage 
earners, including those not covered by collective agreements; 
(g) elimination of employment discrimination on the basis of such grounds as race, religion, age, 
sex, or other grounds as determined by each Party's domestic laws; 
(h) equal pay for men and women; 
(i) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; 
(j) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses; 
(k) protection of migrant workers. 
The NAALC goes on to make a further, and highly significant, definition of technical 
labor standards: 
"Technical labor standards" means laws and regulations, or specific provisions thereof, that are 
directly related to subparagraphs (d) through (k) of the definition of labor law. 
As mentioned above, the NAFTA labor side agreement creates three levels of enforcement: 
i. Consultation 
The lowest level—where there is no enforcement, really—relates to subparagraphs 
(a), (b) and (c): the most fundamental rights of association, organizing and bargaining, 
and the right to strike. These issues are subject only to consultation between what is 
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called the National Administrative Office (NAO) of each country, established by 
Article 15. Any claimed violation of these important labor rights cannot go beyond 
the "consultation" stage of Article 21 "Consultations between NAOs". Consultation 
means just that—talking, and nothing more. 
ii. Evaluation 
"Technical labor standards" defined as subparagraphs (d) - (k) are first subject to a 
consultation, but they can then advance to the next enforcement level: evaluation. 
The NAALC establishes an "Evaluation Committee of Experts" in Article 23. Drawn 
from a tri-national roster of labor experts, a three-member ECE may, at the request 
of a Party (i.e a government) conduct a review and issue an "Evaluation Report" on 
disputes over technical labor standards. 
iii. Dispute Resolution/Sanctions 
Among the eight "technical labor standards" only three, namely items (e), (f) and 
(i), can go beyond the "evaluation" stage to the dispute resolution level of enforcement. 
At this level, sanctions become possible. A country that is found by the ECE to 
demonstrate "a persistent pattern of failure ... to effectively enforce such standards" 
[occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor stan-
dards] can be brought before a five-member Arbitral Panel (drawn, like the ECE, 
from a tri-national roster) for a ruling on whether it has complied with recommendations 
from the ECE. If not, the country is subject to a fine of up to $20 million or a 
suspension of NAFTA benefits up to the amount of the fine if it fails to pay. It 
should be noted that procedural delays built into this mechanism—deadlines for 
submissions, reports, responses, etc.—mean that it will be at least several years 
before any dispute reaches the point of sanctions. 
The weak points of this labor rights regime are obvious. First of all, the key labor rights 
that give voice to working people—freedom of association and the right to engage in 
political action, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the right to strike, are 
excluded from anything more than "consultation". Critical issues in Mexico of government 
and employer domination of the official labor movement,24 and critical issues in the 
United States of anti-union discrimination, strikebreaking, and denial of bargaining 
rights to workers and unions, escape scrutiny under the NAFTA labor side agreement. 
Other issues of paramount importance are susceptible to an "evaluation", but no real 
enforcement. These include forced or prison labor, discrimination against racial minorities, 
against women, against older workers or against disabled workers, and migrant labor 
rights—an acute concern, with millions of Mexicans living and working in the United 
States, often under terrible conditions. 
Finally, even the three subjects potentially open to trade sanctions—child labor, 
minimum wage and occupational safety and health—depend on enforcement of national 
law, not compliance with international standards. Under this approach, weak national 
laws are insulated from reform, as long as they are applied. For example, Mexico's 
minimum wage of less than five dollars per day is easy enough to enforce precisely 
because it is so low—effectively 50% lower than it was in 1980 by virtue of currency 
devaluations and wage restraint policies since then.25 
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Another problem that reflects the dominance of trade interests over labor interests in 
the NAFTA and its labor side agreement is the procedural scheme in the NAALC. 
"Committees" and "panels" of "experts" operating largely behind closed doors will 
carry on the work of the NAALC. It is drawn from the NAFTA model, which is itself 
patterned after the GATT in many respects. Because the NAFTA labor side agreement 
is so new, it remains to be seen whether workers, unions, human rights groups and other 
combatants in the political and legislative battle over the NAFTA will be able to use the 
arena created by the NAALC to advance the cause of worker rights. 
Workers and unions respond with more labor solidarity 
The intertwining of the U.S. and Mexican economies promoted a greater degree of 
cooperation between workers of the two countries even before the NAFTA came to a 
vote.26 In the United States, Mexican immigrant workers and Mexican-Americans have 
become active in many labor groups, especially in Southern California, Texas, Colorado, 
and northern centers like Chicago where many Mexicans have migrated. 
In the San Diego area of Southern California, Mexican construction workers in 1992 
re-established a trade union that had been destroyed a decade earlier in the housing 
development sector. In many large cities the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) has launched a "Justice for Janitors" campaign to organize and raise wages for 
the mostly Hispanic immigrant workers who clean large office buildings. Labor-
community coalitions have formed groups such as La Mujer Obrera (Working Woman) 
in El Paso, Texas and Fuerza Unida (United Force) in San Antonio, Texas to support 
immigrant workers in the garment manufacturing sector. Several trade union, church, 
environmental and human rights organizations formed the Coalition for Justice in the 
Maquiladoras (CJM) and issued Maquiladora Standards of Conduct to establish norms 
for the activities of U.S. multi-national companies in the Mexican border region.27 
Since the early 1970s, hundreds of U.S. corporations have set up shop in the maquiladora, 
taking advantage of special export privileges into the U.S. market. Those companies 
now employ more than 500,000 Mexican workers in the maquiladora, paying an average 
wage of less than $ 1.50 per hour.28 
The UE-F.A.T. Strategic Organizing Alliance 
Beginning in the late 1980's, many U.S. unions and labor advocacy organizations began 
sending delegations of workers and trade union leaders to the maquiladora region along 
the U.S.-Mexico border. In 1992 these exchanges made a qualitative advance with the 
formation of a "Strategic Organizing Alliance" between the United Electrical, Radio 
and Machine Workers of America (UE) and the Frente Autentico del Trabajo (Authentic 
Labor Front), or F. A.T. 
The UE is regarded as one of the most progressive U.S. unions, with a long history of 
militant struggle against such multinational giants as General Electric, Westinghouse, 
Honeywell, Allen-Bradley, Sylvania and other large firms. It is a small union, with 
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40,000 members concentrated in traditional industrial areas in New England and around 
the Great Lakes. However, the UE is active in organizing among Hispanic workers in 
the United States, and is growing rapidly in Southern California and other areas of large 
Hispanic immigration. 
Like the principal unions of teachers and nurses, the UE is not affiliated with the 
AFL-CIO, though it maintains good relations with most AFL-CIO unions and participates 
in many common labor projects with the Federation and with AFL-CIO unions. The 
F.A.T. is the principal independent trade union formation in Mexico. Similar in size to 
the UE, the F.A.T. is not affiliated with the Mexican Confederation of Labor (CTM), 
the largest labor central body. The CTM is the labor arm of the ruling Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI). 
In February, 1992 the UE and the F.A.T. announced their Strategic Organizing Alliance 
with a declared purpose of "exploring practical new forms of international labor solidarity 
in the struggle to improve living and working conditions on both sides of the border".29 
The UE-F. A.T. Alliance targets the factories of UE-represented companies in the United 
States that have relocated all or parts of their operations in the Mexican maquiladora. 
Among these are factories making electric motors, wire harnesses, printed circuit boards 
and other electrical and electronic equipment. 
Several other U.S. unions have undertaken similar projects with their Mexican coun-
terparts, notably the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), the Amal-
gamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), the Communications Workers 
of America (CWA), the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) and the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT).30 The UE-F. A.T. Strategic Organizing Alliance 
also contained a commitment to "continue joint action strategies to fight against the 
proposed North American Free Trade Agreement and to fight for a new Continental 
Development Agreement that benefits the people of the United States, Canada and 
Mexico, not just the corporations".31 
The F.A.T. has recruited and assigned new organizers who have made the G.E., 
Honeywell, Allen-Bradley and other UE-targeted plants in the maquiladora the main 
focus of their work in forming new unions. The UE provides additional resources and 
organizing assistance, sending Spanish-speaking staff members and delegations of UE 
members to Mexico to meet with F.A.T. staffers and with workers from the plants 
targeted for organizing. 
The first plants selected for organizing campaigns were the General Electric small 
motor factory in Juarez, Mexico (near El Paso, Texas) and the Honeywell factory in 
Chihuahua, Mexico—south of Juarez—which manufactures thermostats, printed circuit 
board parts, and heating and air purifier switches. The G.E. plant was a "runaway" from 
UE-represented locations in Indiana, while the Honeywell plant made products relocated 
from a UE-represented Honeywell facility near Chicago and a Teamsters-represented 
facility at Honeywell's headquarters location near Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
The work of the Teamsters union is especially important in developing international 
labor solidarity in the new global economy. Except for the independent teachers union, 
the National Education Association (NEA) (there is a smaller teachers union affiliated 
with the AFL-CIO), the Teamsters union is the largest union in the United States, with 
1.2 million members. It is an extremely diverse union that first represented truckdrivers, 
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but expanded over the years to represent large groups of workers in practically every 
sector of the economy. 
For decades the IBT was an extremely conservative, often right-wing union. In 1991, 
however, a progressive reform leadership team was elected to the presidency and the 
executive board of the Teamsters. The "New Teamsters" leadership has initiated a more 
aggressive bargaining program, and several international solidarity efforts. For example, 
to support Teamster members at the Diamond Walnut enterprise in California, who 
have been on strike for nearly three years while the company continues operations with 
"permanent replacements", the union has established ties with workers and unions in 
Sweden, France, Germany, Britain and other countries where Diamond Walnut corporation 
exports its production. 
Joining issues of labor solidarity under the NAFTA labor side accord— 
The G.E. and Honeywell complaints by the UE and the IBT 
The UE, the Teamsters and the other unions mentioned above were, along with the 
AFL-CIO, the main labor forces in the battle over the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Now the U.S. labor movement is faced with a sharp challenge from multi-
national corporations in connection with the NAFTA and its labor side agreement, the 
"North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation". 
The first test of the labor side agreement has been created by violations of worker 
rights at the General Electric and Honeywell plants where the UE-F.A.T. Strategic 
Organizing Alliance developed its first organizing campaigns. In November, 1993, 
General Electric managers fired ten Mexican workers from the Juarez motor factory 
who participated in a meeting with F.A.T. organizers and a visiting delegation of UE 
members from G.E. plants in Ohio, Pennsylvania and California. Meanwhile, Honeywell 
management fired twenty-one workers who were active in the F.A.T. organizing campaign 
at the Chihuahua factory. In both locations, occupational safety and health hazards and 
overtime pay violations were among the grievances of workers seeking to form a union. 
Coordinating their actions with the F.A.T., the UE and the Teamsters on February 14, 
1994 filed the first complaints to the U.S. National Administrative Office created by the 
NAFTA labor side agreement. They charged G.E. and Honeywell with violations of 
Mexican labor law, with violations of the NAALC's labor principles, and with violations 
of international labor standards. They asked the NAO to investigate the case, to engage 
in consultations with the Mexican government and to hold public hearings on labor 
rights violations in the maquiladora. They further pressed the NAO to pursue the 
additional remedies of establishing an Evaluation Committee of Experts and an Arbitral 
Panel if the dispute remains unresolved.32 
On February 14, the same day that the first NAFTA labor complaints were filed with 
the U.S. government, the UE and the Teamsters launched a national publicity campaign 
to inform the public about labor conditions in the maquiladora and the actions of the 
U.S. multinational companies. They began a national tour of the United States by the 
F.A.T. organizing director and two of the workers fired for organizing, one from the 
G.E. plant and one from the Honeywell factory. The delegation began with media 
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interviews and visits to the AFL-CIO and other national labor union headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. Then the Mexican workers, accompanied by UE and Teamsters 
representatives, went to Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, 
Minneapolis and Los Angeles, gathering extensive press coverage in each city.33 
The trade union solidarity work has had an effect. General Electric reinstated six of 
the fired workers, and claims that the rest accepted severance pay. The unions dispute 
this claim, arguing that the workers had no choice, and that two of the fired workers did 
not accept indemnization and still want their jobs back. They argue further that the 
practice of giving severance pay to workers who are victims of anti-union discrimination, 
rather than reinstatement, has the effect of discouraging continued organizing activity 
among workers who remain. This practice, say labor advocates, violates workers' freedom 
of association and their right to form and join trade unions. Honeywell has not reinstated 
any workers, and says it will only respond to Mexican authorities. 
Union submissions accepted for review 
On April 15, 1994 the U.S. NAO announced it would proceed to a formal review of the 
G.E. and Honeywell cases. Under the terms of a Review, the NAO can: 
1. engage the Mexican government in consultations about workers' rights of association, 
organizing and bargaining, and about occupational safety and health and wage and 
hour violations in the G.E. and Honeywell facilities where the complaints arose; 
2. conduct public hearings at which workers, union organizers, top company managers 
and government officials would testify about the events that gave rise to the complaints; 
3. if issues related to occupational health and safety or wage and hour laws are unresolved, 
establish an Evaluation Committee of Experts to provide an in-depth report and 
recommendations; 
4. if the ECE recommendations are not followed, establish an Arbitral Panel that can 
render a decision; 
5. if the Panel decision is not observed, impose a fine on the government of Mexico; 
6. if the fine is not paid, suspend NAFTA trade benefits—that is, impose pre-NAFTA 
tariffs on products entering the United States—up to the amount of the fine. 
Realistically, trade union advocates do not expect this full reach of the NAFTA labor 
side agreement to come into play in these first complaints. But its mere potential puts 
corporations and governments on notice that their violations of workers rights will 
come under greater scrutiny and possibly embarrassing publicity. 
Labor agreement on the edge 
Behind the scenes, corporate lobbyists pressured the Department of Labor (the NAO is 
a sub-agency of the Department) to dismiss the G.E. and Honeywell cases. They are 
fiercely resisting the implementation of a new, transnational forum where they can be 
called to account for their labor practices. 
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The Council for International Business (CIB) represents the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the Business Roundtable, the 
council of the 100 largest companies in the United States. The CIB demanded that NAO 
reviews only begin after all domestic administrative and judicial remedies have been 
exhausted. Since the typical labor case takes 3-5 years to make its way through the 
courts, this would destroy the usefulness of the NAFTA labor side agreement. 
Even where a review of labor rights violations is begun, the CIB is demanding that no 
public hearings be held, and that the name of a corporation involved in a complaint to 
the NAO be kept secret. The business community argues that since the title of the 
NAFTA labor side agreement is "North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation", 
the NAO cannot conduct an adversarial proceeding where one side makes charges and 
the other side defends itself. The CIB insists that only "cooperative consultations" can 
be undertaken through the NAFTA labor side agreement.34 
The UE, the Teamsters and other labor and human rights advocates respond that the 
CIB approach would "neuter" the NAO and the NAFTA labor side agreement. If the 
NAO had refused to review the G.E. and Honeywell complaints, it would have revealed 
the NAFTA labor side accord to be a hoax, not a serious effort to address worker rights 
in connection with North American trade.35 Thus, the April 15 decision by the U.S. 
National Administrative Office to accept the union complaints and initiate a formal 
review is an important step forward in utilizing this new international forum. 
Conclusion 
This paper is not meant to hinge the fate of the North American working class on 
whether the NAFTA labor side accord is strongly enforced. With or without the NAFTA, 
the continental economy is becoming more interconnected and interdependent. With or 
without NAFTA, workers, trade unions, human rights supporters, environmentalists, 
women's groups, community organizers, farmer advocates, religious activists and other 
progressive forces are forging new ties of solidarity and struggle across the borders of 
the three countries of North America. 
The NAFTA labor side agreement and the mechanism it creates, with each country's 
National Administrative Office as the front line agency for handling labor rights com-
plaints, is just one small feature of the larger landscape being created by forces in the 
regional and global economy. The half-measure established by the NAFTA labor nego-
tiators confirms a phenomenon already familiar to trade unionists: large, powerful multi-
national corporations are in the forefront shaping the new transnational economy; govern-
ments are scrambling behind them to adapt the political and legislative frameworks to 
the new shape of the economy; in the rear come interests of workers and trade unions, 
struggling to survive in the radically changed economic context. 
The NAFTA and its labor side agreement fail to establish common labor rights and 
labor standards, or a means of harmonizing labor rights and labor standards in an 
upward direction. Nonetheless, they do establish a common oversight mechanism with 
the possibility of a new, tri-national arena for working people and their allies to advocate 
on behalf of enhanced labor rights and labor standards. 
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Trade unionists will have a good idea whether the oversight mechanism in the NAFTA's 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation is useful or not, depending on further 
handling of the G.E. and Honeywell cases filed by the UE and the Teamsters. But even 
if this new avenue is has a dead end, the UE-F.A.T. Strategic Organizing Alliance will 
continue its work in the electrical and electronics shops of the maquiladora region. 
Likewise, garment workers, farmworkers, transport workers, tele-communications wor-
kers and others involved in the transnational economy of North America, and their 
unions, will continue to build their alliances and their challenges to the power of 
multinational capital. 
Some recommendations 
To advance their solidarity work in the new regional framework, U.S., Mexican and 
Canadian trade unionists can develop elements of the following program: 
1. Use the international mechanisms 
More unions should bring complaints against employers and governments for violations 
of fundamental labor rights before international human rights commissions of the United 
Nations, the Organization of American States, the International Labor Organization and 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. These international bu-
reaucracies can be slow and frustrating. There should be no illusion of prevailing 
quickly and decisively in these arenas. But such mechanisms should be used as part of a 
long-range strategy to create a climate of greater respect for labor rights and to keep 
pressure on corporations and governments that violate worker rights. 
2. Mount a campaign for a Social Charter in the NAFTA 
The 1993 battle over the North American Free Trade Agreement is hardly the final 
chapter. With changes in governments, changes in parliaments and changes in public 
sentiment certain in years ahead—and new forms of labor solidarity and mass mobilization, 
too—opportunities will arise to again press for a strong Social Charter in the regional 
trade agreement. Already, the AFL-CIO and the Chilean Central Unica de Trabajadores 
(CUT) have agreed to resist Chile's accession to the NAFTA unless a strong labor 
rights provision is included. Likewise, in a new round of GATT negotiations following 
on the Uruguay Round, trade unionists from all countries can develop a campaign for a 
Social Clause in the GATT. 
3. Make international labor rights a focus of labor education 
International issues often lag behind more immediate, pressing concerns in most trade 
unions' educational, communications and leadership training programs. Organizing, 
bargaining, strikes and internal union administration are necessarily uppermost in most 
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unionists' minds. This is especially true in a period of intense attacks on trade unions, 
limited union financial and human resources, and time constraints on activists who are 
also workers with family responsibilities. 
But unions can still develop a basic, simplified curriculum to introduce their members 
and leaders to international issues. Beyond that, a more advanced syllabus can be 
formulated for union staff and local or regional leaders who have completed programs 
on domestic labor concerns. Union news features, instructional material, videos and 
other communications devices can incorporate a greater international perspective. Over 
time, local and regional leaders and rank and file activists, as well as national union 
leaders and staff, will be able to "make the international connection" in meeting their 
organizing and bargaining challenges from the multinational employers. 
4. Bring international labor rights to the bargaining table 
North American trade unionists should make a concerted effort to put language proposals 
requiring respect for international labor rights on the bargaining table in negotiations 
with multinational employers. They can draw from provisions of the UN human rights 
instruments, ILO Conventions, OECD Guidelines, the Social Chapter of the Maastricht 
Treaty and other sources. Such proposals should be accompanied by a broad public 
relations campaign highlighting the proposals and their intended effect of protecting 
worker rights at home and around the world. This move can counter public perceptions 
of unions as narrow, self-interested organizations. It can have a galvanizing and educational 
effect for both union members and union supporters in the community. Although such 
proposals to raise standards in foreign countries might not be sufficient by themselves 
to sustain a strike, they can remain part of a union's set of demands that become strike 
issues. 
5. Invite foreign union representatives to contract talks 
Moves to "internationalize" collective bargaining will be enhanced by the active partici-
pation of union leaders from the U.S., Canada and Mexico in negotiations with multi-
national employers. In U.S. negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement with the 
General Electric company in 1988 and 1991, leaders of the International Metalworkers 
Federation and from many countries where G.E. operates factories joined early stages 
of the negotiations. The knowledge of foreign trade unionists about their own labor 
contracts and working conditions adds an important set of arguments to back up the 
demands of domestic unions in bargaining with the same multinational employer. The 
U.S. unions are planning to have representatives of the F.A.T. join negotiations with 
G.E. later in 1994. The same tactic should be repeated in every multinational company 
that employs workers in the NAFTA region. In the long run, such moves can set the 
stage for genuine joint bargaining for a unitary collective bargaining agreement across 
national boundaries, that can block companies' ability to play off workers in one country 
against those in another. 
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6. Participate in the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) 
Many unions are members of the International Trade Secretariats, the sectoral international 
union bodies that group unions according to branch of industry. Some unions maintain 
close contact with their ITSs, get involved in ITS projects, and pay their affiliation fees 
based on their membership in the sector. Others have diminished their participation in 
recent years as they made painful spending choices under fierce financial pressure. 
Obviously, each union must determine, within its own institutional framework, its degree 
of support for the ITS. But labor internationalists must make the effort, patiently and 
carefully, to educate union members and leaders about the importance of this international 
connection. 
7. Develop "sister union" programs with unions abroad 
A number of U.S. unions at national, regional and local levels have created special 
relationships with foreign unions, most often by virtue of working in the same industry 
or for the same multinational employer. It is often called a "sister union". These relation-
ships are often haphazard, depending more on personal acquaintances than on a strategic 
program to develop such alliances. "Sister union" projects can range from a simple 
exchange of greetings or messages of support for negotiations, to exchanging information 
for bargaining or sending strike support contributions, to actual joint organizing or 
bargaining efforts, or even solidarity strikes. 
8. Get "on-line" with new electronic information systems 
Some unions have moved briskly into new technology systems, setting up "e-mail" 
networks among their own national, regional and local bodies. But only a few are on 
line in international communication networks. The ICFTU and many of the ITSs have 
such networks available, and PeaceNet and other public interest groups carry important 
labor news and developments. Clearly, the multinational companies have instantaneous 
communication capabilities. Unions that deal with them need the same capacity to 
respond quickly to organizing or bargaining crises, to conduct international solidarity 
campaigns, and to plan international events. 
9. Support NGOs and researchers working on labor rights 
Many non-governmental organizations advocate for worker rights in the global economy. 
Many also conduct important research on labor rights and labor conditions. In the 
United States, the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund is the principal 
NGO devoted to labor rights work. This coalition of trade union, religious, human 
rights and educational organizations has amassed a wealth of information and initiated 
several support projects for workers employed by U.S. multinational corporations abroad. 
Other NGOs are increasingly turning their attention to worker rights issues. U.S. 
unionists are familiar with the efforts of the group Human Rights Watch and its affilia-
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tes—Americas Watch, Asia Watch etc.—to report on abusive labor conditions. Amnesty 
International has taken up several cases of trade unionists imprisoned or persecuted for 
their labor activity. Several regional and country-specific rights groups are also devoting 
more attention to labor issues. 
In the economic sphere, U.S. unionists depend on the work of the Economic Policy 
Institute (EPI), a Washington-based "think tank" supported in large part by trade union 
contributions. EPI carries out research on the economics of global labor issues. Another 
research group, the Institute for Policy Studies, looks at the activities of multinational 
companies, especially on the "global assembly line" of electronics and apparel factories 
that employ young women in developing countries. 
* A list of NGOs working on labor's behalf could go on indefinitely. These groups can 
be vital resources and allies for workers and unions dealing with the impact of regional 
and global economic restructuring. Trade unions should support these organizations 
financially, and through coordinated research and education efforts. 
10. Develop foreign language capabilities among labor advocates 
Language barriers are one of the most serious obstacles to international labor work. The 
large size and geographic separation of the United States, combined with a certain 
cultural isolationism, make easy communication with foreign trade unionists difficult. 
Most union leaders well into their adult life are not going to learn a new language. 
However, the U.S. labor movement can commit itself to bringing into leadership many 
of its immigrant worker members who can bring their language ability to trade union 
work. 
Spanish is obviously critical, since relations with Mexico and the rest of Latin America 
are tied to the regional trade framework. Already, many Hispanic Americans are involved 
in trade unionism. But many other workers speak Portuguese, Arabic, French, Creole 
and one of many Asian languages.They, too, can be nurtured by labor leaders sensitive 
to the need for their increased participation in union affairs. 
11. Develop international law skills of labor lawyers 
Trade union staff attorneys and law firms that represent union clients are usually limited 
to work in domestic labor law. But in the new global economy and its regional variations, 
every union should have access to legal counsel based on a thorough knowledge of 
international labor law. This area of the law encompasses both long-established principles, 
as well as the emerging law being shaped by new developments. 
Lawyers with these skills can conduct cases on behalf of the union, or manage cases 
using outside counsel. For example, the UE and Teamster complaints to the U.S. National 
Administrative Office based on G.E.'s and Honeywell's labor rights violations in Mexico 
were prepared by teams of staff attorneys and experienced outside counsel. Just as 
important, international labor lawyers will be able to advise union leaders about important 
legal aspects of international solidarity work. 
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